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Application of Payments
By L. L. Briggs
If a debtor, who owes several separate amounts to one creditor, 
makes a payment which is less than the total debt or less than 
any one of its constituent parts, the problem of applying the 
payment arises. Since the accountant may have the duty of 
solving this problem, a general knowledge of the legal principles 
governing such applications should prove helpful to him. Some 
of the more important legal aspects of payment applications are 
considered in this article.
The debtor has the right to indicate his wishes in respect to the 
application of a voluntary payment. According to Chief Justice 
Marshall in the leading case of Tayloe v. Sandiford (1822) 7 
Wheat. (U. S.) 13:
“A person owing money under distinct contracts has 
undoubtedly a right to apply his payments to whatever 
debt he may choose; . . .”
In Monidah Trust Company v. Hruze (1921) 62 Mont. 444, 
the court said:
"The reason for the rule which confers upon the debtor 
the right primarily to direct the application of a paymens 
voluntarily made by him is apparent. Until the money it 
actually paid over, it belongs to him, and he may do with 
it as he sees fit.”
If the creditor accepts the payment, he is bound by this action 
to obey the directions of the debtor, even though at the time he 
refused to admit them (In re Interborough Construction Corpora­
tion (1923) 288 Fed. 334). The court, in Monidah Trust Com­
pany v. Hruze, expressed the principle in these words:
“ If he (the debtor) makes a specific direction, the creditor 
must observe it or refuse to accept the payment. If he 
(the creditor) accepts and retains the money, the law will 
treat the payment as having been applied as directed.”
In Reed v. Boardman (1838) 20 Pick. (Mass.) 441, the debtor 
sent the creditor a sum of money with notice as to which account 
it was to pay. The creditor refused to accept the payment on 
those terms and refused to admit the payment on that account 
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but did receive and retain the money. The court held that the 
retention of the payment bound him to make the application 
specified by the debtor.
The direction of the debtor is usually in the form of an express 
declaration, although it may be a written or an oral agreement 
between the debtor and the creditor (Hansen v. Rounsavell (1874) 
74 Ill. 238). If the application is in words, these words must 
reach the creditor in order to bind him (Pearce v. Walker (1875) 
103 Ala. 250). However, the debtor is under no obligation to 
make a definite statement in regard to the appropriation, since 
his intent, if this is made known, is sufficient. Chief Justice 
Marshall, in Tayloe v. Sandiford, cited above, said in regard to 
this point:
“. . . although prudence might suggest an express direc­
tion of the application of his (the debtor’s) payments at the 
time of their being made; yet there may be cases in which 
this power would be completely exercised without any 
express direction given at the time.”
If no precise designation has been made, it may, of course, be 
necessary for the debtor to prove facts that will lead a jury to 
infer that he actually intended the specific application which he 
claims (Hall v. Marston (1822) 17 Mass. 575).
Circumstances may reveal the debtor’s intent as to payment 
applications as well as words could indicate. For example, the 
denial of one debt and the acknowledgment of another with 
delivery of the sum due upon it would be conclusive evidence of 
the payer’s intention (Marryatts v. White (1817) 171 reprint 586). 
If there are two debts, of one of which the debtor is aware, of the 
other of which he is ignorant, an intention to pay the known 
debt is presumed (Burchard v. Western Commercial Travelers' 
Association, 139 Mo. A. 606). Should the creditor demand pay­
ment of one of two or more debts and the debtor pay, the law 
considers the payment to be on the demanded debt (Smith v. 
Mould (1914) 149 N. Y. S. 552). Where the debtor inquires as 
to the amount of a particular debt and then pays that amount, 
the intention to pay the debt about which he inquired may be 
reasonably inferred (New York v. Angelo (1911) 129 N. Y. S. 713). 
However, if circumstances are depended upon to indicate the 
application, it is essential that knowledge of them reach the 
creditor, because the mere intention on the part of the debtor to 
appropriate, of which the creditor is unaware, will not bind the 
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latter (Delaware Dredging Company v. Tucker Stevedoring Com­
pany (1928) 25 Fed. (2d) 44).
Should the debtor pay with one intent and the creditor receive 
with another, the intent of the former will govern.
After the debtor has made the application, the creditor has no 
right to divert the money without the consent of the payer 
(Treadwell v. Moore (1852) 34 Me. 112). Should the creditor 
apply the money upon a debt, other than the designated obliga­
tion, and the debtor fail to object, such failure to act is not 
necessarily an acquiescence to the appropriation made by the 
creditor (Ballantine v. Fenn (1914) 88 Vt. 166) because the 
debtor may be ignorant of the diversion (Fargo First National 
Bank v. Roberts (1891) 2 N. D. 195).
An entry made by the debtor on his records when the payment 
is made is an appropriation if this fact is communicated in some 
way to the creditor (Stone v. Rich (1912) 160 N. C. 161). If 
the creditor receives a payment and credits a particular item in 
the debtor’s account and then notifies the payer of that entry, 
and he makes no objection, such action is considered a consent 
to the application by the creditor (Seymour v. Marvin (1851) 11 
Barb. (N. Y.) 80). If the creditor fails to notify the debtor of 
the entry, the creditor’s action is taken as evidence of an appli­
cation by some of our courts (See 3 Williston, Contracts (1920), 
Section 1799). However, the English view, that such entries 
have no effect, seems more reasonable (Simson v. Ingham (1823) 
2 B. & C. 65).
The law sets a time for application of the debtor by stating 
that he must make it at or before the time the creditor receives 
the money (California Bank v. Webb (1884) 94 N. Y. 467). 
One court (Petty v. Dill (1875) 53 Ala. 641) maintained that the 
debtor must act, at least, before the creditor has applied; but, 
even where the creditor has not applied, the debtor is not per­
mitted to direct application long after the payment has been 
made (Dean v. Womack, 2 Tenn. Ch. A. 72) without the consent 
of the creditor (Royal Colliery v. Alwart (1916) 276 Ill. 193). 
The court, in In re American Paper Company (1919) 255 Fed. 
121, held that the debtor may not apply a payment after litiga­
tion in regard to it has been instituted.
The debtor may, at the time of payment, change a direction 
previously given (Ray v. Borgfeldt (1915) 169 Cal. 253) but after 
payment has been made he has no right to change the appropria­
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tion without the creditor’s consent (Hodge v. Hoppock (1878) 
75 N. Y. 491). But should the creditor consent to change of 
application after payment he will be bound by such agreement 
(Thompson v. Reeves (1926) 170 Ark. 409).
Where the debtor makes a voluntary payment and fails to 
make a definite designation and gives no indication of his inten­
tion as to the application of the payment, the creditor, with 
certain restrictions which will be taken up later, is given the 
right to apply the payment to any one of the several debts that 
he sees fit (United States v. Kirkpatrick (1824) 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 
720; Jones v. United States (1849) 7 How. (U. S.) 681; In re 
Lindau (1910) 183 Fed. 608). Chief Justice Marshall, in Field 
v. Holland (1810) 6 Cranch. (U. S.) 28, said:
“ . . . When a debtor fails to avail himself of the power 
which he possesses, in consequence of which that power 
devolves on the creditor, it does not appear unreasonable 
to suppose that he is content with the manner in which the 
creditor will exercise it.”
The performance of some act which shows the intention 
specifically to apply the payment to a particular debt constitutes 
appropriation on the part of the creditor (Reynolds v. Patten 
(1894) 30 N. Y. S. 1050). Circumstances as well as express 
declarations may indicate the creditor’s intent (Felin v. First 
Mortgage Guarantee (1915) 248 Pa. 195). However, the mere 
intent to apply is not sufficient, according to the court in Schoon­
over v. Osborne (1902) 117 Iowa 427).
These are some of the acts which are evidence of application 
on the part of the creditor: entry of credit on a particular account 
(Jones v. United States (1849) 7 How. (U. S.) 681); indorsement 
of payment on a note (Sanborn v. Cole (1891) 63 Vt. 590) if 
notice be given the debtor; institution of a suit by the creditor, 
in the jurisdictions where the creditor may apply at any time 
prior to judgment or verdict (State v. Blakemore (1918) 275 
Mo. 695).
Naturally, the creditor will wish to apply the payment to the 
item or items which he thinks are least likely to be paid, and, with 
certain restrictions, the law will support him if he makes such an 
appropriation (Hildreth v. Davis, 6 Kulp (Pa.) 336). If other 
rules do not prohibit, he is given the right to apply the payment 
to debts not secured (Turner v. Woodard (1919) 259 Fed. 737) 
or he may select the most precarious of the secured claims. (In 
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re Lysaght (1903) 1 Ir. 235). If one of the debts is the sole 
obligation of the debtor, and the others are with surety, guar­
antor or joint debtor, the creditor may apply a general payment 
by the debtor from his own funds to the debt which is not pro­
tected and continue to hold the surety or others bound. If one 
debt is a bond, or covenant under seal, and the other is by a 
simple contract or open account, the creditor may appropriate a 
payment to the latter {Mayor v. Patten (1808) 8 Cranch (U. S.) 
317). Should one debt be by judgment and the other by simple 
contract, the creditor has the privilege of application to the 
latter (Richardson v. Washington Bank (1842) 3 Mete. (Mass.) 
536). In case of two different accounts, one of which is later than 
the other, the creditor, if he so desires, may apply the payment 
to the later account {Henry Bill Publishing Company v. Utley 
(1892) 155 Mass. 366) or he may apply half of the payment to 
each of the accounts if neither is barred by the statute of limita­
tions {Beck v. Haas (1892) 111 Mo. 264).
Although there are some contrary decisions, the general rule, 
in respect to running accounts, is that the creditor may apply 
the payment as he chooses {Sheppard v. Steele (1870) 43 N. Y. 
52). Consequently, he may apply to the oldest items (Jones v. 
United States (1849) 7 How. (U. S.) 681) even though these items 
are barred by the statute of limitations {Brown v. Osborne (1910) 
136 Ky. 456). However, if he applies without making known 
his intention to apply to a specific item, the presumption is that 
he applies to the oldest {American Woolen Company v. Maaget 
(1912) 86 Conn. 234).
There are some restrictions upon the rights of the creditor to 
apply when the debtor fails to exercise his privilege of appro­
priation. The courts insist that the debtor must have known 
and have voluntarily given up his right to direct the application 
of the payment which he has made before the creditor may 
apply. In Bancroft v. Dumas (1849) 21 Vt. 456, the court went 
so far as to hold that the creditor must make the application in 
such a way that the debtor could have no reasonable objection. 
In some circumstances, on account of the relation in which he 
stands to third persons, or from agreement with them, expressed 
or implied, he may be obliged to make a particular appropriation. 
For example, if the debtor who owes the creditor also owes a 
party for whom the creditor is trustee, a general payment by the 
debtor must be applied pro rata between the creditor’s debt and
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that of the party for whom he is trustee, since a trustee is bound 
to take the same care of his cestui que trust’s interests that he 
does of his own (Scott v. Ray (1836) 18 Pickering (Mass.) 361). 
A prior legal debt must be given preference over a later debt in 
equity. If there are several debts, and only one of these is valid, 
the creditor must apply the payment to this debt, without any 
consideration whatever of the order in point of time in which this 
item appears on the records (Backman v. Wright (1855) 27 Vt. 187).
If a debt is due at the time an unappropriated payment is 
made, the courts assume that the creditor will apply the payment 
to such debt, in preference to those which are not due at that 
time (Baker v. Stackpoole, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 420). The creditor 
may apply the payment to debts which are not due, if he has an 
express agreement with the debtor to that effect (Shaw v. Pratt 
(1839) 22 Pick. (Mass.) 305) but he is under no obligation to 
receive payment of such a debt and if he accepts the money he 
must apply it as the payer orders (Levystein v. Whitman (1877) 
59 Ala. 345).
The creditor has no right to apply unappropriated funds to 
claims that are illegal and consequently are not recoverable at 
law (Caldwell v. Wentworth (1843) 14 N. H. 431). In Richardson 
v. Woodbury (1853) 12 Cush. 279, it was held that if payments 
made on account by a debtor be applied by the creditors, under a 
previous agreement, to certain items of the account which are 
illegal, such payments are valid, and can not afterwards be 
revoked by the debtor. This seems to be a recognition of the 
principle that a debtor may elect to have his payment applied to 
an illegal debt. In an early Maine case, Treadwell v. Moore 
(1852) 34 Me. 112, the court decided that debts resulting from 
the sale of liquor, which was illegal in Maine by statute, might 
be legally credited if the payment was applied by the debtor.
The courts have refused to allow a creditor to apply an un­
appropriated payment to debts barred by the statute of limita­
tions with the object of reviving them (Pond v. Williams (1854) 
1 Gray (Mass.) 630). However, the debtor has the right of 
waiving the bar of the statute and may permit such an application 
as will renew the former obligations. If he remains silent after 
learning that the creditor has applied the payment so as to revive 
the outlawed debt, he will be estopped from denying that the 
money was paid on such debt (Watt v. Hoch (1855) 25 Pa. 411). 
Usually, the creditor has the burden of proving the intent of the 
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debtor to renew the outlawed obligation. This intent may be 
inferred from accounting entries which were made before the 
payment or from the fact that the debtor has paid interest on 
the renewed debt. The payment, if part, will generally be 
applied toward the barred debt if such is the desire of the debtor, 
but the balance of the debt is not revived (Pond v. Williams 
(1854) 1 Gray (Mass.) 630). In A yer v. Hawkins (1846) 19 Vt. 
26, the court decided that a creditor may apply a general pay­
ment to any one of several barred accounts, and this payment 
will revive the balance of that particular account, but he will not 
be permitted to distribute the credit among the several accounts, 
so as to revive them all.
The civil law requires that the creditor make the application 
of a general payment very soon after receiving the money from 
the debtor; but the common law is more liberal. There is con­
siderable conflict among the decisions as to how long the right 
exists for the creditor. A few dicta indicate the necessity of 
applying within a reasonable time. Between debtor and creditor, 
the weight of authority is that an application by the latter at 
any time before a controversy arises or a suit is brought will be 
good (Bacon v. Dollar Steamship Lines (1923) 290 Fed. 964; 
Pierce v. Knight (1859) 31 Vt. 701). If third parties are involved, 
the creditor must act within a reasonable time (Robinson v. 
Doolittle (1840) 12 Vt. 249). When the time arrives for the 
creditor to declare his election, he may not refuse to do so, and 
he will not be permitted, to the inconvenience and injury of 
others, to hold the application in reserve to await the turn of 
future events. The rule is different in England, for in that 
country a creditor has been allowed to apply in the witness box 
(Seymour v. Pickett (1905) 1 K. B. 715).
Application by the creditor may become fixed by oral declara­
tion; by the terms of the receipt rendered; by rendering an 
account; by bringing a suit based upon a specific appropriation; 
or by any other act showing an intent or inducing a belief that a 
particular application has been made (Allen v. Kimball (1839) 
23 Pickering (Mass.) 473).
After the appropriation has been made by the creditor, he 
can not change it without the consent of the debtor (The Sophia 
Johnson (1916) 237 Fed. 406). If the debtor consents, any 
change agreeable to both parties is generally permissible (Thomp­
son v. Reeves (1926) 170 Ark. 409).
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The creditor has no option with regard to application if the 
payment is involuntary on the part of the debtor (Blackstone 
Bank v. Hill (1830) 10 Pickering (Mass.) 129). He is under 
obligation to apply the payment pro rata to all the unpaid 
accounts. This rule is followed where the creditor obtains the 
money through judicial proceedings. The share received by a 
creditor from an insolvent debtor through an assignment must 
be applied pro rata to all the claims against the debtor and not 
only to such debts as are otherwise unsecured (Bank of Portland 
v. Brown (1843) 22 Maine 295).
If no application has been made or indicated by either the 
debtor or the creditor, the duty of appropriation falls upon the 
court which will usually apply the payment as it sees fit with 
due consideration to the interests of both parties (Harker v. 
Conrad (1825) 12 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 301; Pope v. Transparent 
Ice Company (1895) 91 Va. 79). According to Justice Story, in 
United States v. Kirkpatrick (1824) 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 720:
“The general doctrine is that the debtor has a right, if he 
pleases, to make the appropriation of payments; if he omits 
it, the creditor may make it; if both omit it, the law will 
apply the payments, according to its own notions of justice.”
In some circumstances, the jury, acting on the evidence and 
under instructions of the court, will apply (Oliver v. Phelps 
(1843) 20 N. J. L. 180).
The court will attempt to follow the intention or understanding 
of the parties, before or at the time of payment, if this can be 
inferred or implied from the circumstances (Emery v. Tichout 
(1841) 13 Vt. 15; Gillett v. Depuy (1900) 63 N. Y. S. 49) but if 
this is impossible, it will be guided by a general presumption of 
intention founded on reason, probability and justice. In The 
Martha (1887) 29 Fed. 708, it was held that that application is 
presumed to have been agreed upon to which it is most probable 
that the parties would have assented.
The law will usually apply a general payment to a debt which 
is due, in preference to one that is not due, since the presumption 
is that the debtor intends a payment, not a deposit (Upham v. 
Lefavour (1846) 11 Metc. (Mass.) 174). A certain debt is pre­
ferred to one which depends upon the happenings of some con­
tingency (Snyder v. Robinson (1871) 35 Ind. 311; President v. 
Brown (1843) 22 Maine 295). The application will generally be 
made to the oldest of several debts (Kloepfer v. Maker (1903)
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84 N. Y. S. 138). If priority is not involved, that debt which 
is unsecured or is least secured will receive the credit in the 
states following the common-law rule (Barbee v. Morris (1906) 
221 Ill. 382). In case the debt which is least secured is not prior 
to the others, there are several decisions to the effect that the 
time element should be ignored and the application made to the 
least secured obligation (Schuelenberg v. Martin (1880) 2 Fed. 
747; Smith v. Lewiston Steam Mill (1891) 66 N. H. 613). How­
ever, the weight of authority favors application to the earliest 
debt (Moses v. Noble (1888) 86 Ala. 407; Wortheley v. Emerson 
(1874) 116 Mass. 374). Payment will not be applied to debts 
contracted after payment (London v. Parrott (1899) 125 Cal. 
472) nor to a future indebtedness (Harrison v. Johnson (1855) 
27 Ala. 445) nor to demands which are not enforceable.
In case of continuous accounts, payment will be applied to the 
earliest, if there is no express direction or inference to the contrary 
(Winnebago Paper Mills v. Travis (1894) 56 Minn. 480). This 
point was settled more than a century ago when Justice Story, in 
United States v. Kirkpatrick (1824) 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 720, said:
“In cases ... of long and running accounts, where 
debts and credits are perpetually accruing, and no balances 
are otherwise adjusted than for the mere purpose of making 
rests, we are of the opinion, that payments ought to be applied 
to extinguish the debts according to the priority of time: 
so that the credits are to be deemed payments pro tanto of 
the debts antecedently due.”
Application will not usually be made to disputed items (Banner 
Grain Company v. Burr Farmers' Elevator (1925) 162 Minn. 334. 
Where some of the items are illegal, payment will be applied to 
the earliest legal items.
If there is no evidence to the contrary, and the amount paid 
by the debtor is exactly equal to one of the several debts, there 
are decisions to the effect that the jury may infer that the debtor 
intends that the money be applied to that obligation (Seymour 
v. Van Slyck, 8 Wend. (N. Y.) 403). Whether the debts are of a 
higher or a lower order makes no difference in application of 
payments to them. (Pennypacker v. Umberger (1854) 22 Pa. 
492). For example, if one debt is a specialty and the others are 
simple contracts, all will be treated alike in respect to order of pay­
ment when the court applies. If the simple contracts were prior 
to the specialty they will be paid before the specialty. Priority 
is the determining factor, while dignity of the contract is ignored.
180
Application of Payments
If the creditor of an old firm continues his business with a new 
partnership which has taken over the business of the old one, 
payments will be applied to the old debt, unless a different 
intention of the debtor can be proved. If a firm creditor is also 
creditor to a partner, a payment by a partner of partnership 
funds should be applied to the partnership debts in preference 
to the partner’s personal obligations (Codman v. Armstrong 
(1848) 28 Maine 91).
Where interest is due on any account, the courts will use the 
payment to settle the interest, and, if there is anything left, it 
will be applied upon the principal of the debt (Sheppard v. New 
York (1915) 216 N. Y. 251; Jacobs v. Ballenger (1891) 130 Ind. 
231). If there are several debts of the same degree, all carrying 
interest, a general payment will be applied to all of the interest 
before reducing the principal of any one of the obligations. In 
Steele v. Taylor (1836) 4 Dana (Ky.) 445, the court said:
“When a debtor fails to make a prompt payment of his 
debt, the law has fixed a rate of interest that he shall pay, 
as a reasonable compensation to the creditor for the delay. 
And, as interest will not bear interest, though it be as justly 
due as the principal, the creditor is deprived of the use of 
the interest without compensation for it. It is, therefore, 
just and equitable, when the credit is left to be applied by 
the chancellor, that it should be first applied to the extin­
guishment of the whole interest, or that portion of the fund, 
which is withheld by the debtor, that draws no interest.”
Let us summarize. The debtor has the right to direct the 
application of a voluntary payment; if he fails to use this right, 
it passes to the creditor, who, with certain restrictions, may 
apply the money as he thinks best. If both the debtor and the 
creditor fail to indicate their intention in respect to the appro­
priation, the court will take over the right and will apply the 
payment according to its idea of justice.
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